Why Impeachment Failed II

Perhaps if the public hadn’t been subjected to four years of interminable hysteria over the United States’ imaginary descent into fascism, it might have been less apathetic toward the fate of “vital” Ukrainian aid that most Democrats had voted against when Obama was president.

And perhaps if institutional media hadn’t spent three years pushing a hyperbolically paranoid narrative of Russian collusion — a debunked conspiracy theory incessantly repeated by Democrats during the impeachment trial — the public wouldn’t be anesthetized to another alleged national emergency.


Beyond the public’s mood, the Democrats’ strategy was a mess. House Dems and their 17 witnesses set impossible-to-meet expectations, declaring that Trump had engaged in the worst wrongdoing ever committed by any president in history. (I’m not exaggerating.) When it comes to Trump criticism, everything is always “the worst thing ever!”


Quotation of the Day…

(Don Boudreaux) Tweet … is from pages 19-20 of Mario Rizzo’s and Glen Whitman’s much-anticipated 2020 Cambridge University Press book, Escaping Paternalism: Rationality, Behavioral Economics, and Public Policy (reference excluded):

To make matters worse, there is little reason to believe that legislators and bureaucrats will engage in the kind of careful, modest, data-driven policymaking that behavioral paternalists envision.  Lacking sufficient knowledge of people’s “true” preferences, but nevertheless charged with creating policy, policymakers will inevitably find some other basis on which to do so. Even when they are not manipulated by pressure groups, policymakers are likely to rely on simple rules of thumb and unjustified assumptions. They presumably share the behavioral and cognitive biases that paternalists have attributed to private decision-makers, but they lack the effective incentives that the latter have to correct their own failings. Consequently, we argue that policymakers will tend to promote some combination of their own preferences, socially approved preferences, or special-interest preferences – none of which are synonymous with the real preferences of people targeted by paternalist laws.

Source: Quotation of the Day…

How Cheap Would a Health Care Public Option Be?

5. How cheap would a health care public option be?

Source: Saturday assorted links

If Congress follows its past behavior, a public option could add over $700 billion to the 10-year federal deficit, with dramatically larger losses in subsequent years. Furthermore, to avoid large increases in deficits, a politically realistic public option could require tax increases on most Americans, including middle-income families.